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Abstract. Stealth address prevents public association of a blockchain
transaction’s output with a recipient’s wallet address and hides the ac-
tual destination address of a transaction. While stealth address provides
an effective privacy-enhancing technology for a cryptocurrency network,
it requires blockchain nodes to actively monitor all the transactions and
compute the purported destination addresses, which restricts its applica-
tion for resource-constrained environments like Internet of Things (IoT).
In this paper, we propose DKSAP-IoT, a faster dual-key stealth address
protocol for blockchain-based IoT systems. DKSAP-IoT utilizes a tech-
nique similar to the TLS session resumption to improve the performance
and reduce the transaction size at the same time between two commu-
nication peers. Our theoretical analysis as well as the extensive experi-
ments on an embedded computing platform demonstrate that DKSAP-
IoT is able to reduce the computational overhead by at least 50% when
compared to the state-of-the-art scheme, thereby paving the way for its
application to blockchain-based IoT systems.
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1 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) has been connecting extraordinarily large number
of smart devices to the Internet and driving the digital transformation of indus-
try. Unfortunately, existing cloud-centric IoT systems have a number of signifi-
cant disadvantages such as high system maintenance costs, slow response time,
security and privacy concerns, etc. Blockchain, a form of distributed, immutable
and time-stamped ledger technology, has been perceived as a promising solution
to address the aforementioned problems and to securely unlock the business and
operational values of IoT. The combination of blockchain and IoT facilitates the
sharing of services and resources, creates audit trails and enables automation of
time-consuming workflows in various applications. While combining these two
technologies is creating new levels of trust, the decentralized network and public
verifiability of blockchain transactions often do not provide the strong security
and privacy properties required by the users.
During the past few years, quite a few cryptographic techniques such as
ring signature [10], stealth address [1], and zero-knowledge proof [4] have been
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employed to ensure transaction privacy for senders, receivers and transaction
amount in blockchains [8,11,13,22]. This work focuses on stealth address, a pri-
vacy protection technique for receivers of cryptocurrencies. Stealth address re-
quires the sender to create random one-time addresses for every transaction on
behalf of the recipient so that different payments made to the same payee unlink-
able. The most basic stealth address scheme [1] was first sketched by a Bitcoin
Forum member named ‘ByteCoin’ in 2011, which was then improved in [13,19]
by introducing the random ephemeral key pair and fixing the issue that the
sender might change the mind and reverse the payment. Later on, a dual-key
enhancement [18] to the previous stealth address schemes was implemented in
2014, which utilized two pairs of cryptographic keys for designated third parties
(e.g., auditors, proxy servers, read-only wallets, etc.) removing the unlinkability
of the stealth addresses without simultaneously allowing payments to be spent.
The dual-key stealth address protocol (DKSAP) provides strong anonymity
for transaction receivers and enables them to receive unlinkable payments in
practice. However, this approach does require blockchain nodes to constantly
compute the purported destination addresses and find the corresponding matches
in the blockchain. While this process works well for full-fledged computers, it
poses new challenges for resource-constrained IoT devices. Considering the lim-
ited energy budget of smart devices, we propose a lightweight variant of DKSAP,
namely DKSAP-IoT, which is based on the similar idea as the TLS session re-
sumption [2,14] and requires both the sender and receiver to keep track of the
continuously updated pairwise keys for each payment session. DKSAP-IoT is able
to improve the performance of DKSAP by at least 50% and reduce the trans-
action size simultaneously, thereby providing an efficient solution to protecting
the privacy of recipients in blockchain-based IoT systems.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief overview
of the elliptic curve cryptography, followed by the description of the dual-address
stealth address protocol (DKSAP) in Section 3. In Section 4, we present DKSAP-
IoT, a faster dual-key stealth address protocol for blockchain-based IoT systems.
Section 5 analyzes the security and performance of the proposed scheme. Finally,
Section 6 concludes this contribution.
2 Preliminaries
An elliptic curve E over a field F is defined by the Weierstrass equation:
E(F) : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x+ a6,
where a1, a2, a3, a4, a6 ∈ F and the curve discriminant ∆ 6= 0. The set of solutions
(x, y) ∈ F × F satisfying the above equation along with the identity element
O, or point-at-infinity, form an abelian group under the addition operation +
(i.e., the chord-and-tangent group law). It is this abelian group that is used in
the construction of elliptic curve cryptosystems. Given an elliptic curve point
G ∈ E(F) and an integer k, the scalar multiplication kG is defined by the
addition of the point G to itself k − 1 times, i.e.,
kG = G+G+ · · ·+G︸ ︷︷ ︸
k − 1 additions
.
The scalar multiplication is the fundamental operation in elliptic curve based
cryptographic protocols such as the Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key
agreement [16] and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)
[16], etc. The security of elliptic curve cryptosystems is based on the difficulty
of solving the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP) [6,7]. This
problem involves finding the integer k (0 < k < n) given a point kG, where
n is the group order of E(F). The 15 elliptic curves have been recommended
by NIST in the FIPS 186-2 standard for U.S. federal government [3], which
are also contained in the specification defined by the Standards for Efficient
Cryptography Group (SECG) [17]. For example, the elliptic curve used in Bitcoin
is called secp256k1 with parameters specified by SECG [17]. For more details
about elliptic curve cryptography, the interested reader is referred to [5].
3 Dual-Key Stealth Address Protocol (DKSAP)
The first full working implementation of DKSAP was announced by a developer
known as rynomster/sdcoin in 2014 for ShadowSend [18], a capable, efficient
and decentralized anonymous wallet solution. The DKSAP has been realized in a
number of cryptocurrency systems since then, including Monero [8], Samourai
Wallet [15], TokenPay [20], just to name a few. The protocol takes advantage
of two pairs of cryptographic keys, namely a ‘scan key’ pair and a ‘spend key’
pair, and computes a one-time payment address per transaction, as illustrated
in Fig. 1.
When a sender A would like to send a transaction to a receiver B in a stealth
mode [18], DKSAP works as follows:
1. The receiver B has a pair of private/public keys (vB , VB) and (sB , SB),
where vB and sB are called B’s ‘scan private key’ and ‘spend private key’,
respectively, whereas VB = vBG and SB = sBG are the corresponding public
keys. Note that none of VB and SB ever appear in the blockchain and only
the sender A and the receiver B know those keys.
2. The sender A generates an ephemeral key pair (rA, RA) with RA = rAG and
0 < rA < n, and sends RA to the receiver B.
3. Both the sender A and the receiver B can perform the ECDH protocol to
compute a shared secret:
cAB = H(rAvBG) = H(rAVB) = H(vBRA),
where H(·) is a cryptographic hash function.
4. The sender A can now generate the destination address of the receiver B to
which A should send the payment:
TA = cABG+ SB .
Fig. 1. The Dual-Key Stealth Address Protocol (DKSAP)
Note that the one-time destination address TA is publicly visible and appears
on the blockchain.
5. Depending on whether the wallet is encrypted, the receiver B can compute
the same destination address in two different ways:
T ′A = cABG+ SB = (cAB + sB)G.
The corresponding ephemeral private key is
t′A = cAB + sB ,
which can only be computed by the receiver B, thereby enabling B to spend
the payment received from A later on.
In DKSAP, the receiver B needs to actively scan the blockchain transactions,
calculate the purported destination address and compare it with the one in each
block until a match is found. In the case that an auditor or a proxy server exists
in the system, the receiver B can share the ‘scan private key’ vB and the ‘spend
public key’ SB with the auditor/proxy server so that those entities can scan the
blockchain transactions on behalf of the receiver B. However, they are not able
to compute the ephemeral private key t′A and spend the payment received from
the sender A.
4 Faster Dual-Key Stealth Address Protocol for Internet
of Things (DKSAP-IoT)
In this section, we describe a faster dual-key stealth address protocol called
DKSAP-IoT, which is dedicatedly designed for blockchain-based IoT systems.
4.1 Design Rationale
In DKSAP, the receiver B scans the blockchain and calculates the purported
destination address for each transaction, which requires computations of two
scalar multiplications, including one random-point scalar multiplication with
the ephemeral public key RA and one fixed-point scalar multiplication with the
base point G. For resource-constrained IoT devices, computing two scalar multi-
plications continuously for each blockchain transaction is going to drain battery
power of smart devices dramatically. Furthermore, containing an ephemeral pub-
lic key in each stealth payment increases the size of the transaction and incurs
additional communication overhead for IoT devices as well.
Motivated by the TLS session resumption techniques [2,14], we aim to ac-
celerate the process for receivers finding the matched destination address by
extending the lifetime of the shared secret between senders and receivers. While
both the session ID [2] and the session ticket [14] are fixed in TLS for a given
period of time between the client and server, the sender does need to generate
a one-time destination address for each payment sent to the same recipient in
our case. To this end, both the sender and receiver will apply the cryptographic
hash function to their shared secret for subsequent N transactions before the
sender initiates a shared secret update with a fresh ephemeral public key. This
key evolving process is shown in Fig. 2, which leads to the design of DKSAP-IoT,
a faster dual-key stealth address protocol for blockchain-based IoT systems, as
detailed in the next subsection.
Fig. 2. The Key Evolving Process Between the Sender and Receiver in DKSAP-IoT
4.2 DKSAP-IoT Specification
DKSAP-IoT is similar to DKSAP except that whenever the sender and receiver
establish a shared secret using ECDH it will be continuously and pseudoran-
domly updated with a cryptographic hash function and used in their subsequent
N stealth transactions. Both the sender and receiver maintain the transaction
state (i.e., shared secret, counter, etc.) locally and update it after each stealth
transaction. A high-level description of DKSAP-IoT is depicted in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. The Dual-Key Stealth Address Protocol for IoT (DKSAP-IoT)
In a blockchain-based IoT system, two smart devices A and B can process a
transaction in a stealth mode using DKSAP-IoT as described below:
1. The receiver device B is pre-installed with a ‘scan key’ pair (vB , VB) and a
‘spend key’ pair (sB , SB) as in DKSAP, where VB = vBG and SB = sBG.
2. For sending a transaction to B, the sender device A first checks whether B
is in A’s receiver list. If B is in the list and the counter value cntB is less
than N (i.e., A has communicated with B before), A retrieves the shared
secret hcntB from the table and computes the destination public key:
TA = hcntBG+ SB .
The stealth transaction that only contains the destination public key TA as
well as the payment amount is then added into the blockchain. In the case
that B is not in the list or the counter value is greater than N , A generates
a fresh ephemeral public key RA = rAG and calculates the shared secret
h0 = H(rAVB) as well as the destination public key as in DKSAP:
TA = h0G+ SB .
Here the stealth transaction is composed of the ephemeral public key RA,
the destination public key TA and the payment amount. After putting the
transaction on the blockchain, the sender A will initialize the ephemeral
public key counter cntB = 0. In both cases, the counter cntB and the shared
secret hcntB will be updated as well:
cntB ← cntB + 1, hcntB ← H(hcntB−1).
Note that only the counter cntB is updated when it reaches N .
3. Upon receiving a stealth transaction, the receiver B first checks whether the
transaction contains an ephemeral public key RA. If it is, B computes the
purported shared secret and destination public key:
h0 = H(vBRA), T
′
A = h0G+ SB .
If the purported destination public key T ′A matches the received one (i.e.,
T ′A = TA), B accepts the payment from A and computes the corresponding
private key for spending:
t′A = h0 + sB .
B also sets the ephemeral public key counter cntA to be 0, updates the
counter and shared secret, and precomputes the expected destination key
pair for the next stealth transaction from A:
cntA ← cntA + 1, hcntA ← H(hcntA−1), (1)
T ′A = hcntAG+ SB , t
′
A = hcntA + sB . (2)
When B receives a stealth transaction without an ephemeral public key, B
will check whether the received destination public key TA is contained in
its list of senders. If a match is found and the value of the counter cntA is
less than or equal to N , B retrieves the corresponding destination private
key t′A as the spending key and updates the transaction state information
accordingly with the equations (1) and (2). Again only the counter cntA is
updated when it reaches N .
In DKSAP-IoT, stealth transactions are divided into two categories depending
on whether ephemeral public keys are included in the blocks. For the first stealth
transaction between two blockchain nodes, the receiver needs to conduct the
same operations as DKSAP, followed by a more efficient preparation process for
the next transaction. For the subsequent N stealth transactions between the
same peers, generating a fresh ephemeral key is no longer needed on the sender
side. Meanwhile, the receiver only performs a fast table look-up as well as the
transaction state updates, which facilitates the receiver to quickly filter out the
designated transactions.
Given the ‘scan private key’ vB and the ‘spend public key’ SB , the audi-
tor/proxy server is able to calculate all the destination addresses for the receiver
B, thereby tracking or forwarding all the transactions to B. However, both the
auditor or the proxy server cannot derive the corresponding ephemeral private
keys and spend the funds.
5 Security Analysis and Performance Evaluation
In this section, we analyze the security and performance of DKSAP-IoT and
report its implementation on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B, a good representative
of moderately resource-constrained embedded devices.
5.1 Security Analysis
DKSAP-IoT follows the same threat model as DKSAP, in which the adversary
aims to determine the corresponding recipients by observing the transactions on
the blockchain. DKSAP-IoT provides the following security properties:
– Receiver Anonymity: DKSAP-IoT offers strong anonymity for receivers
and ensures the unlinkability of payments received by the same payee. For
each payment to a stealth address, the sender computes a new normal address
TA on which the funds ought to be received. Given two destination addresses
T
(i)
A = hiG+ SB and T
(j)
A = hjG+ SB (0 ≤ i, j ≤ N) for the same receiver
B, the adversary is not able to link them thanks to the difficulty of ECDLP.
– Forward Privacy: DKSAP-IoT provides forward secrecy due to the usage of
a cryptographic hash function for updating the shared secret continuously for
N stealth transactions. If the adversary compromises the device and obtains
hl for the l
th (0 < l < N) stealth transaction, he/she is still not able to link
previous transactions because of the properties of the hash function.
– Stealth Transaction Hiding: In DKSAP, transactions in the stealth mode
can be easily distinguished from regular ones in the blockchain due to the
presence of ephemeral public keys, thereby resulting in some loss of privacy.
However, the ephemeral public key only needs to be updated every N stealth
transactions for two communication peers in DKSAP-IoT and those stealth
transactions in between are not distinguishable from regular ones.
Since both the sender and receiver need to locally maintain the state infor-
mation for their peers in DKSAP-IoT (See Fig. 3), these tables, together with
the device private keys, should be stored in the encrypted form for mitigating
the risk that IoT devices might get compromised. Considering that the hardware
AES engine is widely available on many IoT devices, the computational overhead
for encrypting/decrypting those sensitive information is quite small.
5.2 Performance Evaluation
Computational and Communication Overhead. We assume that a sender
is going to send N stealth transactions to a receiver using blockchain. Let RP,
FP and H denote the computation of a random-point scalar multiplication, a
fixed-point scalar multiplication and a cryptographic hash function, respectively.
Table 1 gives a comparison between the DKSAP and DKSAP-IoT in terms of their
computational overhead.
Table 1. Computational Overhead of DKSAP and DKSAP-IoT for Sending N Stealth
Transactions between Two Blockchain Nodes
Scheme
Sender Receiver
#RP #FP #H #RP #FP #H
DKSAP N 2N N N N N
DKSAP-IoT 1 N + 1 N 1 N N
From Table 1, one can see that DKSAP-IoT is able to reduce the number of
RP and FP by N − 1 on the sender side, respectively, when compared to the
DKSAP. Moreover, DKSAP-IoT can also save N − 1 RP on the receiver side.
With respect to the communication overhead, the sender in DKSAP-IoT only
needs to contain a fresh ephemeral public key in the first stealth transaction,
thereby saving the transmission of N − 1 elliptic curve points.
Software Implementation. To validate the performance improvements of
DKSAP-IoT, we implemented an optimized elliptic curve cryptography library,
namely libsect283k11, using the 283-bit binary Koblitz curve specified in [17]:
E(F2283) : y2 + xy = x3 + 1,
where the binary field F2283 is defined by f(x) = x283 + x12 + x7 + x5 + 1. The
library was written in C and compiled using the GNU C Compiler (GCC). A
number of efficient techniques, such as the lambda coordinates [9], the window
τNAF method [5], the pre-computation [21], etc., have been utilized to optimized
the performance of the libsect283k1 library. Moreover, BLAKE-256 [12] is chosen
as the hash function in our library due to its high performance cross multiple
computing platforms. When running our library on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B,
the timings for the computation of RP, FP and H are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Timings for Computing RP, FP and H on a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B
RP FP H
3.67 ms 3.12 ms 5.26 µs
1 libsect283k1 will be integrated into the IoTeX testnet and mainnet as part of the
iotex-core (see https://github.com/iotexproject/iotex-core).
Note that the computation of the hash function is about three orders of
magnitude faster than that of the scalar multiplication over an elliptic curve.
Therefore, using the hash function to update the shared secret and extend its
lifetime brings significant performance benefits for IoT devices. Fig. 4 compares
the performance of the DKSAP and DKSAP-IoT on both sender and receiver
sides for sending N = 10, 20 and 30 stealth transactions, respectively.
Fig. 4. Performance Comparison of the DKSAP and DKSAP-IoT for SendingN = 10, 20
and 30 Stealth Transactions
From Fig. 4, one notices that the overall cost of DKSAP-IoT is less than 50%
of DKSAP, mainly because extending the lifetime of the shared secret with a
cryptographic hash function enables both the sender and receiver to reduce the
number of RP from N to 1. Moreover, the computation of the hash function is
almost negligible compared to the scalar multiplication over the elliptic curve. In
addition, DKSAP-IoT can save the transmission of 72·(N−1) bytes for N stealth
transactions. For resource-constrained IoT devices, the improved performance
and reduced transaction size by DKSAP-IoT leads to significant power savings
and extended battery life.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an efficient dual-key stealth address protocol DKSAP-
IoT for blockchain-based IoT systems. Motived by the TLS session resumption
techniques, we apply a cryptographic hash function to continuously update a
shared secret between two communication peers and extend the lifetime of this
shared secret for additional N transactions. Both the sender and receiver need
to maintain the state information locally in order to keep track of the pair-
wise session keys. The security analysis shows that DKSAP-IoT provides receiver
anonymity and forward privacy. When implementing DKSAP-IoT on a Raspberry
Pi 3 Model B, we demonstrate that DKSAP-IoT can achieve at least 50% perfor-
mance improvement when compared to the original DKSAP, besides significant
reduction of the transaction size in the block. Our work is another logic step
towards providing strong privacy protection for blockchain-based IoT systems.
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